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Nosocomial outbreaks, especially with (multi-)resistant microorganisms, are a major prob-
lem for health care institutions. They can cause morbidity and mortality for patients and con-
trolling these costs substantial amounts of funds and resources. However, how much is
unclear. This study sets out to provide a comparable overview of the costs of multiple out-
breaks in a single academic hospital in the Netherlands.
Methods
Based on interviews with the involved staff, multiple databases and stored records from the
Infection Prevention Division all actions undertaken, extra staff employment, use of
resources, bed-occupancy rates, and other miscellaneous cost drivers during different out-
breaks were scored and quantified into Euros. This led to total costs per outbreak and an
estimated average cost per positive patient per outbreak day.
Results
Seven outbreaks that occurred between 2012 and 2014 in the hospital were evaluated.
Total costs for the hospital ranged between €10,778 and €356,754. Costs per positive
patient per outbreak day, ranged between €10 and €1,369 (95% CI: €49-€1,042), with a
mean of €546 and a median of €519. Majority of the costs (50%) were made because of
closed beds.
Conclusions
This analysis is the first to give a comparable overview of various outbreaks, caused by dif-
ferent microorganisms, in the same hospital and all analyzed with the same method. It
shows a large variation within the average costs due to different factors (e.g. closure of
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wards, type of ward). All outbreaks however cost considerable amounts of efforts and
money (up to €356,754), including missed revenue and control measures.
Introduction
Nosocomial outbreaks are a major problem for health care institutions due to increased mor-
bidity and mortality for the affected patients. The containment and control of these outbreaks
costs substantial amounts of funds and resources, especially when left unnoticed or untreated
[1]. Rising antimicrobial resistance levels further increase the difficulty to treat nosocomial
infections, incurring increasing costs [2–4]. Although it is known for some organisms what the
burden of disease is when a nosocomial infection occurs [3–5], estimates of the exact costs for
health care institutions during outbreaks are scarce. Knowing the average cost of an outbreak
per patient per day can help decision makers to justify the necessary investments in infection
prevention and control measures, thus improving the decision making process[6]. This study
sets out to evaluate several nosocomial outbreaks within a single Dutch academic hospital with
an active Infection Prevention Unit, over a time period of three years.
Within the Netherlands there is proactive national infection prevention and control collabo-
ration through the Working group Infection Prevention (www.wip.nl). They provide over 130
different guidelines on infection prevention, stating all the actions health care institutions
should perform and facilitate. The Search-and-Destroy policy for MRSA is one of the success
stories of the Dutch infection prevention approach [7]. In this study we provide a transparent
cost-analysis, describing in detail the costs that occur during the control of an outbreak in a
large Dutch academic hospital and related costs of missed revenues due to closed beds. These
data will give a comparable overview of outbreaks caused by multiple microorganisms in one
health care center, thus providing novel insights into nosocomial outbreak costs.
Material and Methods
All evaluated outbreaks occurred between 2012 and 2014 in a university medical center in the
north of the Netherlands with 1339 registered beds, including a separate rehabilitation center.
Outbreaks for which all data was available to perform an analysis were evaluated. Costing
was done from a hospital perspective. All identifiable extra costs that were made due to an out-
break were taken into account (from the start of the outbreak until one year after the end of the
outbreak). An outbreak was defined as at least two patients who were tested positive as indica-
tor for colonization or infection for the same microorganism (bacterial or viral), with some epi-
demiological link (e.g. same time-period, same ward). The duration of an outbreak was
counted in days and began on the day that the Infection Prevention Unit started measures to
control the outbreak until the day that they decided the risk of transmission was over and addi-
tional control measures were not deemed necessary anymore. When an outbreak was sus-
pected, the Infection Prevention Unit provided assistance to the affected ward and advised on
extra surveillance cultures, extra cleaning, isolation of patients, and possible closure of the
ward if necessary. Actions are based on the local and national infection prevention guidelines.
Counted costs were divided into: microbiological diagnostics/surveillance costs; missed rev-
enue due to closed beds (based upon the difference in bed occupancy rates compared to the
two months before); additional cleaning costs; additional personnel (infection prevention,
nursing staff and clinicians); costs made for contact or strict isolation of patients and other
costs (e.g. purchase of extra materials, possible prolonged length of stay, extra medication). In
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order to take into account all possible costs that occurred, a wide range of different sources
were used to ensure that no expenses were overlooked. Admission data came from the general
hospital database. Numbers of cultures came from the Medical Microbiology Database and the
prices for the diagnostics were internal cost prices (depending on type of diagnostic between
€25 and €200 per sample). Extra personnel and possible other costs were calculated based on
interviews with the, at that time, involved staff (i.e. head nurses and medical specialists),
together with detailed case reports from each outbreak made by the Infection Prevention Unit.
Bed day cost prices (ranging between €464.39 and €1829.78, depending on the type of ward
and excluding variable costs) and personnel costs (ranging between €19.23 and €75.54 per
hour) were based upon Dutch reference prices [8]. It was assumed that the hospital will not lay
off any (temporary) personnel during closure of wards, meaning personnel costs were consid-
ered fixed for this study. When calculating extra workload for the personnel due to infection
control measures, these costs were included as opportunity costs. Isolation costs were calcu-
lated after internal evaluation (€25.14 for contact and €33.51 for strict isolation per day). Addi-
tional cleaning costs and the prices for those were calculated based on interviews and stored
records as provided by the department of technical—and facility services (€25.38 per hour).
When calculating the missed revenue, only the (fixed) bed day cost price was taken into
account. Possible opportunity costs for the (fixed) personnel costs were left out in order to be
more conservative in the calculation. All prices were converted to 2015 Euro level, using Dutch
consumer index figures (www.cbs.nl).
This analysis followed the CHEERS guideline and included all applicable items as recom-
mended when reporting economic evaluations [9]. The study was purely observational and ret-
rospective of nature and performed on outbreak level. The anonymized data used for the
analyses were collected by those authors functioning as treating physicians, from the depart-
ment’s own database. The collected data did not include any (in)directly identifiable personal
details and the analyzing authors had no access to those, complying with the local data protec-
tion committee regarding clinical data processing. Following Dutch legislation and guidelines
of the local ethics commission approval was therefore not required (http://www.ccmo.nl). Cal-
culations were done with Microsoft Excel (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) and SPSS (IBM,
Amonk, NY, USA). When statistics were performed, a significance level of p< 0.05 was
applied.
Results
Outbreak and patient characteristics
In total, seven different outbreaks could be financially evaluated. One outbreak caused by a
virus and seven bacterial outbreaks (see Table 1 for the responsible microorganisms). For these
outbreaks there were between 3 and 37 positive patients. The duration was between 16 and 86
days. Characteristics of the outbreaks can be found in Table 1. The Pantoea transmission was
treated as an outbreak because it occurred on a neonatal ICU.
Cost-analysis
Total costs for the hospital ranged between €10,778 for the Norovirus outbreak and €356,754
for the 2014 S.marcescens outbreak. On average, costs per positive patient per outbreak day,
ranged between €10 for the Norovirus outbreak and €1,368 for the ESBL K. pneumonia on the
nursing ward (95% CI: €49-€1042). The mean of the total average costs per positive patient per
day comes to €546 and the median to €519.Within the average costs per positive patient per
outbreak day, the majority of the costs (50%) were made because there was the closure of (mul-
tiple) ward(s) leading to missed revenue; 17% of the costs were for extra microbiological
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diagnostics; 11% due to contact or strict isolation of patients; 10% for extra personnel; 7% for
other costs; and 5% due to extra cleaning on the affected wards (see Table 2). Interquartile
ranges of the costs per different categories are displayed in Fig 1. Binary regression analysis
showed that a bacterial outbreak is correlated with higher average costs per patient per day
compared to the single viral outbreak (p = 0.02).
Discussion
Seven outbreaks were evaluated and costs varied substantially. On average, the additional costs
due to an outbreak were €546 per positive patient per outbreak day. These average costs ranged
between €10 and €1,369. The most expensive outbreak per patient per outbreak day was an
ESBL producing K. pneumonia. The highest costs in this outbreak occurred due to a two week
closure of the ward, which not only led to a drop in admitted patients, but also to a cancellation
of scheduled procedures which could not be replaced with others due to the short term of the
cancellation. The lowest average costs were made for the Norovirus outbreak. This was mainly
due to the specifics of this infection, less diagnostics were necessary, because only patients with
Noro-like symptoms (e.g. watery diarrhea) were tested. Due to the short incubation time,
chances of undetected transmission are small. Furthermore, in this case closure of the ward
was deemed unnecessary and there was no excess morbidity or mortality for the patients due
to their Noro infection. In almost all cases of the evaluated outbreaks, patients were colonized
but not infected. During the Klebsiella outbreak in the rehabilitation center there was excess
morbidity in the form of one sepsis episode and subsequently all costs made during this admis-
sion were taken into account and categorized under ‘Other’. For the S.marcescens outbreak
there was excess length of stay observed for two patients by the treating medical specialist. Also
Table 1. Outbreak and patient characteristics.
Microorganism Year Ward Positive persons Average age (years) Gender(% male) Duration (days)
Pantoea spp. 2012 ICU 9 0.0 (25 days) 54% 36
S. aureus (MRSA) 2012 Nursing 3 56.9 75% 16
K. pneumonia (ESBL) 2012 Nursing 5 73.2 50% 24
K. pneumonia (ESBL) 2012 Rehabilitation 9 44.5 100% 17
E. faecium (VRE) 2013 Nursing 19 61.1 95% 50
Norovirus 2013 Rehabilitation 37 59.6 53% 28
S. marcescens 2014 ICU 8 0.1 50% 86
MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; ESBL: Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase; VRE: Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149226.t001
Table 2. Average costs per positive patient per outbreak day.
Microorganism Total Diagnostics Closed bed Cleaning Personnel Patient isolation Other
Pantoea spp. €88.11 €53.50 €0.00 € 0.70 €8.80 € 24.40 €0.70
S. aureus (MRSA) €657.08 €205.20 €221.79 €34.67 € 112.33 € 72.25 € 10.83
K. pneumonia (ESBL) €1,368.92 €70.59 € 1,144.50 €17.76 €33.27 € 46.28 € 56.52
K. pneumonia (ESBL) €980.51 €234.17 € 98.03 €150.93 € 154.94 € 227.55 € 114.90
E. faecium (VRE) €197.26 € 64.45 € 69.27 € 3.74 €42.08 € 17.72 €0.00
Norovirus €10.40 € 5.21 €0.00 € 0.55 €2.21 €2.33 € 0.10
S. marcescens €518.54 € 19.34 €375.00 € 0.68 €15.59 € 25.67 € 82.27
MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; ESBL: Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase; VRE: Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149226.t002
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in this case, these costs were taken into account and categorized under ‘Other’. Ergo, it seems
that outbreak and microorganism specific characteristics cause large variation in the total
costs. This variation together with the relatively small number of outbreaks also meant that
correlation analyses on the data were impracticable. We therefore chose to give a descriptive
overview. Based upon this cost-analysis we hypothesize that on average a viral outbreak is most
likely to be less expensive than a bacterial one. This is mainly due to easier and quicker detec-
tion which reduces the duration and the microbiological costs. For bacterial outbreaks we
observed large variation in the costs. One of the biggest cost drivers is the closure of wards and
the subsequent drop in revenue, especially when this closure has consequences for scheduled
procedures. Cleaning costs are dependent on the type of ward, with less additional costs on an
ICU ward, because cleaning procedures are already strict and higher costs in the rehabilitation
center due to extra rooms (e.g. physiotherapy exercise rooms) that had to be cleaned more
strict than normal.
Although there are numerous studies on the (financial) burden of disease of resistant organ-
isms and nosocomial infections [3, 10], there are just a few cost-analyses published on nosoco-
mial outbreaks. Notably, financial evaluations of Norovirus outbreaks are published most [11–
15]. Besides Noro, there are publications on P. aeruginosa, MRSA, Acinetobacter and VRE
[16–19]. Although difficult to compare, because the methods were not always similar, total
costs seem comparable, but average costs per patient per outbreak day seem slightly lower than
those found here. The difference is likely to be caused by different definitions for the duration
of an outbreak. This study took the time during which extra infection prevention measures on
the ward were in place. Others choose to count the days between the first positive culture of the
index patient until discharge of the last positive patient, which might be considerably longer,
thereby lowering the average cost. The lack of financial evaluations and consistency within
those evaluations does however clearly show the need for more studies and especially a more
consistent methodological approach.
Strength of this study is the fact that multiple outbreaks caused by different microorganisms
in a single hospital were evaluated. This gives a comparable overview of how cost categories dif-
fer between different outbreak situations. Limitations are that it is a retrospective analysis and
Fig 1. Interquartile ranges of the costs (in Euros) per category.Medians are depicted by the X, within the
closed beds there was one outlier of €1144.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149226.g001
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it might be that data are missing because of this. However, by using multiple sources for data,
this aspect is minimized. Still, preferable all data are collected prospectively. Depending on
national health care systems it will differ who will be bear the costs. This makes comparison
between different studies from different countries more difficult. By presenting the costs within
different categories we tried to make interpretation of the data more flexible and adaptable to
other settings. Finally, with only one viral outbreak, this category is under represented, there
were however no more suitable viral outbreaks to include during the evaluated time-period.
Concluding, we present a cost-analysis of multiple outbreaks in an academic center.
Although costs differ between different outbreaks, due the microorganism or type of ward, the
average costs per patient per day seem substantial. Especially with ever rising antimicrobial
resistance levels, such outbreaks as described here are becoming continuously more difficult to
treat and costs are expected to rise even further in the future. Average costs of an outbreak per
patient per day as presented here can be used to further clarify costs and benefits within hospi-
tals related to infection prevention. Ultimately this should help decision makers to justify the
necessary investments in infection prevention and control measures. Our study may thus con-
tribute to more transparency in health care budgets and improve the decision making processes
concerning where to invest. Notably, extra argumentation can be found in these findings for
investments into infection prevention and control measures to avert outbreaks or to contain
them swiftly.
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